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INTERVIEW WITH EDWARD G. LANSDALE 
November 19, 1982 
INTERVIEWERS: William Gibbons, Patricia McAdams 
PLACE: McLean, Virginia 
; 
William Gibbons: First of all, when did you first go to Vietnam? 
Was it with General O'Daniel or had you gone previously? 
Edward Lansdale: I went with General J. W. O'Daniel on his White 
House mission in 1953. It was just by chance. O'Daniel and his group had 
come by the Philippines and stopped off at Clark Field overnight on the way 
out to Saigon. O'Daniel asked me a lot of questions about the Huks that we 
were fighting in the Philippines, the problems of fighting guerrillas and 
guerrilla warfare types of actions. And as I talked to him he said, "Would 
you like to come with us out to Indochina and see one there?" I said, "I 
would very much like to," and I said, "When are you leaving?" He said, 
"Wheels up at six in the morning." This was about 10 or 11 at night and I 
said, "All right~" I thought he said they were going to be there for five 
days, or something like that. Instead of that, we went over there for four 
weeks. I had to free myself for that, since I was right in the middle of all 
sorts of things in the Philippines. When we got to Saigon, the French were 
surprise~, were appalled r~ally, that I was there. Some of their diplomats 
and political people had been over to visit in the Philippines to see the Huk 
fighting, and I knew them. Politicians in that part of the world were scared 
of me. They feared I was going to bring democracy with me, change their 
governments. Some French felt very much that way, apparently. And they put 
up a real scream to our mission and to O'Daniel, but General Navarre was just 
taking over command then, and Navarre said, "No, I welcome someone like him 
being here." He gave us a lunch the day after we got there -- all of the 
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brass attended -- and he asked me, he said, "You know, I'm coming up with a 
new plan for our forces, and," he said, "I would value any of your notes and 
ideas on fighting the Viet Minh guerrillas here." He added, "Would you help 
me with the supplementary parts of my plan on intelligence, psychological 
warfare, and clandestine operations, and so on?" So, that's what I did while 
I was there. He wrote out his personal orders to me to show to the commanders 
around, so I had a very rare view of the war from the French side. 
They were edgy I even saw some of their clandestine operations. 
because it was the SCEDE [the French CIA] operating there. I asked the SCEDE p1 ~ ~ :5 DE<:e-J 
about its relations with the top command setup here in getting operational 
support airlifts, and so forth. I pointed out that since I had the ear of the 
top general for my visit, perhaps I could help them a little bit. "Come here, 
we'll show you everything," they said. And they almost did. They showed me 
the training and mounting of operations in very casual, relaxed brifings. 
There was a lot of teasing back and forth. I took a photograph of all of 
their officers in the nude when they were swimming down at Cape St. Jacques, 
where they had their camp; I had scrambled back to the beach, yelled at them, 
got them all to come out of the water, and took some pictures. I told them 
that I would give their pictures to the CIA in Saigon, which I did. I'd 
borrowed this camera. It was a box brownie, a lousy camera. I don't know 
whatever happened to the picture. [ laughter] 
I also got in on French Army psychological operations, which were 
very good up around Hanoi at the time; terrible elsewhere. Their combat 
intelligence suffered very badly there; very shallow and tardy in some of the 
commands. I got_ flights up to the area near the China border and once saw the 
convoys coming down from China, truck convoys, loaded with munitions and other 
supplies~ I thought they were French. I asked the pilot, ''What the hell is 
that down there? You don't have any forces near that you're supporting." And 
he said, "Oh, no, those are enemy supplies for the Communists." So I said, 
"How the hell can they go along highways?" Why doesn't your air force bomb 
them, interdict them, and stop them." And he said, "Hell, we can't. We don't 
have enough air power to do that." It surprised me very much to see such open 
support of the Viet Minh guerrilla forces from China. 
Gibbons: Did you know anything about Vietnam at that point? 
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Lansdale: I knew far too little before this visit. Mostly it was 
what I had learned from reading the papers, from talks with Americans in 
Manila who were visiting from our MAAG in Saigon, and from visits to the 
Philippines by French ann Vietnamese officials. But, I really knew too little 
about the country and its people, 
Next January, I was home and was asked to attend a meeting in the 
Pentagon, a policy affair at which John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of 
Defense, and other officials were present. It was about Indo-China, French 
requests for aircraft, Dien Bien Phu, and so on. I was sitting with Philip 
Bonsal, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East at the time, 
and John Foster Dulles, just as he was talking, turned around and said, "We're 
going to send you over there, Ed." [laughter] I was just sitting there, you 
know, so I said, "I'm not going over there. Hell, it's the goddamn French 
colons with their colony and •... " And he said, "Won't you go?" And I said, 
"Well, if it means helping the Vietnamese, sure, but there's a lot I have to 
learn about the place. I have to learn the language and read up on Vietnamese 
affairs." He said, "Well, we want you to go over and help the Vietnamese the 
way you helped the Filipinos." 
So I went and started French lessons. But Magsaysay, who was then 
President of the Philippines, was calling me at home and asking me to please 
get back to Manila for a time. He said he was having trouble with his 
Congress, particularly the Senate, there, and since I knew all the Congressmen 
and Senators, would I please come back and work on relations for him. I told 
him, •~ell, I have other duties that are sort of pressing now, a different 
country they want me to go to, and I have to learn a language and do a lot of 
studying." My Dad was visiting me, at the time, and he said, "Who's that 
fellow who keeps calling every night?" And I said, "Oh, some guy out in the 
Philippines." So, he didn't quite believe all that was going on. Then the 
phone rang a bit later -- right after my last turn-down, and after Magsaysay 
talked to me about three or four times. It was the Pentagon. They said, 
"President Eisenhower just got a call from President Magsaysay of the 
Philippines and he agreed that you 're going out to help him." [laughter] 
"And you get out there promptly." So, as I was ordered out there, I was 
begging them, I said, "Please don't cut orders for Vietnam until I get a 
/ 
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chance to learn at least French," There was no Vietnamese language training 
at the time. So I went back to the Philippines. 
They ordered me from Manila over to Vietnam in a great hurry 
finally, for some reason, probably due to the impending Conference at 
Geneva. They hurried me over there, and on my orders there was a phrase, "God 
bless you" at the end [laughter], instead of all the reference marks for 
authorizing the flight and Vietnam duty. So, I bummed a ride with an Air-Sea 
Rescue flight and went over to Vietnam and checked in, I learned that General 
O'Daniel and Ambassador Heath had both asked for me, too, along with the 
Secretary having said something. 
Gibbons: You have described how you reacted to Diem's arrival --
his inconspicuous entry into Saigon, 
Lansdale: Yes. 
Gibbons: And then you gave him your proposal for how he might 
effectively govern the country. 
know. 
That's never been published, as far as I 
Lansdale: I don't know what ever happened to it. I don't know. 
Gibbons: It's been described, generally, in a couple of places, as 
you know. At that time, you still didn't know very much about Vietnam. 
Lansdale: No, But I'd gotten around a lot and seen a lot. And I 
still tried to understand what I'd seen. The eye tells you something, but I 
was always very conscious that I was a foreigner and that I had an American 
background. I kept trying to translate into what I knew, and some things just 
wouldn't translate easily. 
Gibbons: Well, this is leading up to what I was going to ask you. 
You didn't know very much, you were a foreigner. As you look back on it, do 
you think you were making recommendations to Diem that were made realistically 
in the context of the Vietnamese culture? 
Lansdale: Yes, I do. I didn't go into things that I wasn't firm 
enough about. What I was recommending to him was what people were telling me 
that they needed and I could see that they needed it. They were wanting 
certain things from their own government and their own people, and this was 
, 
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pretty much what I was writing about. These were mostly Vietnamese views that 
I tried to pass along to him. 
Gibbons: I see. I had thought from your comment about how he might 
have entered Saigon that you seemed to be applying your own Western values, 
political values, in a sense. 
Lansdale: In talking to him later on, yes, I would very much. I 
was being myself, and I'd tell him, this is what we do in my country. I don't 
know about here, but try this, and see. Yet, certain values are very basic to 
human nature. I always realize the truest words you get any place, in any 
country are from the farmer, the guy who is working with his own hands and 
making his own living in the field. He has the truest views of politics and 
everything else -- nothing subtle, it's always very basic. The Vietnamese 
peasant or farmers on both sides just wished both political sides would go 
away and disappear and leave them alone. All through the war, they were 
always that way. I used to go out and talk to them as much as I could, just 
to get their slant on things. And in my own mind, I had always tried to see 
beyond what the very material aspects of something were -- of housing and 
architecture and the way of life and the type of food they eat and so on, to 
get down below the surface -- to get at the people, I've been very fortunate 
in having that urge to understand, somehow or other, as part of my make-up, 
and did that when I was in Vietnam because so much was strange looking to me. 
Before Diem had arrived, I had gone out with an official in the 
Ministry of Social Justice, visiting the sections of Saigon and Cholon where 
the very poor and destitute were living. We were trying to help them help 
themselves, and organize them to do so. The man in the government who was 
doing all that used to take me around with him. He said, "Is there something 
very different you can do to help in this organization?" I said, "Yes, you 
want me to teach the people how to vote for who in their community is going to 
run the community?" He said, that's a great idea. So I set up elections in 
all of these wards in Saigon and Cholon. Initially, the people wanted to 
know, "How do we swipe electricity from the city's power lines and similar 
things," but we started them on programs for self-improvement. I taught them 
how to vote secretly. They couldn't read or write. I showed them how to make 
symbols for each candidate, let each candidate pick a symbol that the voters 
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could copy, and fold a piece of paper and put it in the ballot box. The 
French surrete and the authorities at the time got very worried at my going to 
these places. They used to come in and say, "It's very dangerous being alone 
with all of these people here." And I said, "Oh, no, they are inviting me in 
for tea," and so on. And the big crowds down in these communities got a 
terrific kick out of these elections. They thought that was the greatest. 
invention since the wheel. And you could see these old guys with these wispy 
beards and everything holding up a big cross or a circle or some fancy thing 
that was his symbol, while each made an election speech. And then everybody 
would vote. 
City folks, in turn, would tell me about relatives out in the 
provinces, and I'd go out with them for visits. I started getting in close 
with some of the religious sects and other groupings and political parties 
around the country. I was going through quite an education and I was quite 
aware that I had an awful lot to learn yet. So, with a new Prime Minister 
[Diem] coming in, I was very careful to try and reflect what the people had 
said. They had told me good and bad attitudes of their landlords. Some had 
been in debt for generations due to the usury of the moneylenders. There were 
a lot of things that were open to reforms. Also, there were fundamental 
lacks. A demand and no supply. Strangely enough, I found out where people 
were cold at night and needed blankets. Imagine that, down there near the 
tropics. In some swampy areas they needed mosquito netting. There were so 
damned many big mosquitos around there, I'd swear that they could go in and 
fly off with a water buffalo. [ laughter] You'd go into government warehouses 
and see mosquito netting stacked in there and not being used. A government 
leader would have to work on distributing such essentials to people in need. 
And th~re was another lack that was most evident. There was a great lack of 
capable civil service people in government. They weren't there. The French 
were running things, but the French were going to pull out and weren't 
training enough people to take their places. 
Gibbons: Yes. 
Lansdale: And the enemy, at least, were training their cadre to 
come in and run the provinces and cities and towns. Our side didn't have 
enough of that. There was just a great big vacuum there. Somebody would have 
- 7 -
to start paying attention to that very soon and finding out some ways of 
taking care of those things, particularly when at Geneva a pact had been 
signed for, among other things, a plebesci te on who would take over the 
country. Well, on our side, there was a vacuum out in the countryside. 
Except for some large cities, there were too few capable Vietnamese to take 
care of things, including organizing a vote, getting people to the polls, 
encouraging a pro vote, or coping with the enemy's political moves. There 
were two million more people up in the northern side than in the south, so I 
just figured the Communists could win the vote for easy, you know, controlling 
their people down to the polling place and telling them how to vote, and on 
our side there was disorganization. That influenced my thinking on civil 
service, as well as helping get the refugee program started. They were going 
to bring down several thousand refugees. I was always talking millions. I 
said, "You've got to bring down at least one million to balance out the 
population for the plebiscite and, then hopefully, we can get two million of 
them down and have more down here to vote on our side, if we treat them 
well." I was very mindful of the Palestinian refugees, and how badly that had 
been handled, and I said, ''We can't keep these refugees in camp. We've got to 
figure how to get them on the farms and fishing and into useful occupations 
when they get down here and pick up their lives again, so we don't have to 
keep on taking care of them forever in camp some place, which just leads to 
political mischief eventually. 
Gibbons: Well, then you brought your team in, and did any of them 
have any prior knowledge of Vietnam? 
Lansdale: One of them did. Lou Conein. He'd gone in in '45. He 
was OSS. He had come in out of China. He had worked against the Viet Minh 
and with the French. He knew the French side of Indochina intimately and was 
very sympathetic towards it. He didn't know the Vietnamese side as well. He 
was the only one. I had some French speakers with me, but nobody at the time 
spoke Vietnamese. They all learned quickly once they were in Vietnam. 
Gibbons: Do you think this was a handicap. Obviously, it was a 
handicap to our country. 
Lansdale: Yes. 
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Gibbons: ..• at that point and later. 
Lansdale: Very much so, yes. I think the big thing there was that 
\ 
most Americans didn't even regard the Vietnamese -- whichever side they were 
on -- as human beings, as fellow humans. And that wasn't looking down or 
denigrating them at all, Vietnamese looked so different, so exotic, that when 
you started talking about them from the American viewpoint you overlooked 
their human traits. I remember my first visit to the nationalist Lien Miuh G ic:..,, 
guerrilla group. I said, "These people remind me of the Green Mountain Boys 
in our own Revolution. They're from the boondocks and they're full of love 
for their country." The Americans I talked to looked at me as if I was nuts 
or something, you know, the look in their eye. How can you talk that way? It 
used to sadden me that Americans didn't understand. And even later, with so 
many Americans there, the Americans that really caught on were very far and 
few between. They were there, and they were good people, but they were quite 
rare. 
I remember much later on in the war, I was visiting a town just 
south of Saigon, a Vietnamese regiment down there, and they had an American 
Signal Corps sergeant advising them on communications. He was a Sgt. 
Valentine. I remember his name. I was with the Minister of Rural 
Reconstruction, their pacification program. He was trying to get the troops 
to act decently towards the farmers there. Troops were swiping farmer's roofs 
to build bunkers at the headquarters. And this sergeant said, "That's an 
important lesson he's teaching there," he said. "I've been in this war twice 
now. I've come back to it again. We've got to learn to teach the Vietnamese 
to love each other." He said, "People have to learn to love each other." Now 
mind you, this is a sergeant speaking. He was from New Mexico, but he was 
originally a Puerto Rican; and from a very poor family. He was killed that 
night. I flew down the next day to see what had happened. I had heard there 
had been an attack. I saw his body there and helped pick it up. I've always 
remembered his remark to me. 
Gibbons: Do you think this cultural factor -- did we make any major 
mistakes during the war as a result, let's say, of not understanding the 
culture? One of the things I'm thinking about is the way we kept pressing 




Lansdale: I think Diem, and the other leaders, once you sat down 
with them and went over their problems carefully and listened hard, you could 
always find out the things that they needed to do to help themselves, to make 
themselves look good or win or whatever it was, which would be our aim also, 
and get them to agree to it. It was really very simple. But we used to try 
to force them bluntly to do things. It used to be sort of an extra medal or 
kudo for an ambassador, or whoever was trying to twist an arm, to get them to 
do it. 
always 
And I think that was quite wrong. 
found them very easy to convince 
They more than understood, and I 
to do the right thing, for 
themselves. And also, in Asia there's a sense of humor, and I don't think we 
always went in with a sense of humor to match it. One of the clues to getting 
along was seeing what was funny, laughing at the right things, and also being 
able to smile. The biggest passport in the world is a smile. 
I remember getting in an accident in Saigon once. I hadn't been 
alert enough and I started grinning sort of sheepishly. A taxi cab had run 
into me. The cab driver saw my face and he started grinning the same way. We 
got out and shook hands. He went off. The American first secretary from the 
embassy was with me, and he said, "How did you do that?" And I said, "Do 
what?" He said, "You didn't even talk to the guy. And you both seemed to 
know something. What was it that you knew?" I said, ''We were both stupid and 
we acknowledged it by the way we looked and acted towards each other. We 
parted amicably because there wasn't enough of a wreck, just a bump." He 
said, "Gee, I thought you'd be there arguing with him forever and a day." 
Another time, the Marines took me to a village where they were doing 
civic action, up in II Corps. We were going along a trail through the village 
and the Marine corps general and his aides were marching ahead. They were 
shouting· out "Chao ong," "Good Morning" in Vietnamese, to all the villagers. 
But they were doing it in parade ground voices. They'd take a big, deep 
breath and shout out "Chao ong," and the people in this village you could 
see them lined up in windows and doors -- were all taking big breaths and 
shouting back "Chao ong." I was walking right behind the general, watching 
this, and I started laughing; the yelling back and forth was really sort of a 
funny. Seeing my grins, the villagers starting laughing, too. They came out 
of their homes and joined us as we were walking up this path in the village. 
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The general turned around and said, "What's up?" I said, "What do you mean, 
what's up?" He said, "All these people are with you back there and you're all 
laughing. Something's real funny." I said, "No, no, no. We're just happy 
about the way you' re using the language." 
sight; it was a very human thing. 
[laughter] But it was a funny 
The blacks used to catch on, among the American troops. You'd see 
the blacks down with the kids playing, they'd be playing horsey in the street 
with the little kids riding them and they were down in the dirt and rolling 
with them and laughing, and the people loved that. Some of our people talked 
about the black troops not being very good, but I said, "Gee, I'm happy 
they're here. They're showing a real, good human side of America that these 
people need." 
Gibbons: You were talking about the fact that there seemed always 
to be a gap between the feeling of those of you in Vietnam and the people in 
Washington. Was there also a problem from this cultural standpoint. Did you 
get pushed by Washington more than you felt you should be, For example, did 
they seem not to understand certain things that they should have? Such as how 
to treat Diem, for example. 
Lansdale: I didn't run across that problem directly myself, But I 
sort of did, second-hand. I used to see it in Washington, when I was in the 
Pentagon handling messages going out to the Ambassador. They would tell him 
to coerce Diem, give him ''do this or else" type of responses. Several times, 
I tried to get State to temper their language and let a senior ambassador be a 
human being in his dealings. It's insulting, really, to talk that way, to a 
head of state, an ally. Evidently, I didn't succeed, When dealing with him 
personally, I usually got Diem to do things for his own good, and for the good 
of his people. And once he became convinced that it was for the good, he'd go 
ahead and do it. That it was within U.S. policy to do so was only 
incidental. At times, Diem didn't understand what was being asked of him. 
Once, he asked me what a "chain of command" was in the military. General 
O'Daniel had told him how necessary it was. I had to spell it out to him, at 
length. Another time, German financiers had talked of "flooring" loans and I 
got an American economist to explain it. 
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Gibbons : I wanted to ask you about the spring of 1955, after 
Collins came back and you were still there and there were all of these 
problems. The U.S. Government was on the verge of approving the replacement 
of Diem. In retrospect, do you think that that would have been a good idea at 
that point? 
Lansdale: No. I say no, not just because I was close to him. They 
had been changing prime ministers from those that were very pro-French and 
almost Frenchmen, to independent types, but there weren 't that many Vietnamese 
to choose between at the time who would have any knowledge or experience at 
all in running things any executive ability. Diem had his weaknesses on 
executive ability, but everybody among the Vietnamese, even those who didn't 
like him, admitted he was very honest and trying to do an honest job. So that 
you'd always sort of excuse him when he'd do things a little wrong; at least 
he was honest in trying to do things at that period. Not only that, but they 
had just been through a real crisis. They were fighting the sects, and they 
were trying to get themselves organized as a government. It was no time to 
change leaders. I couldn't make anybody understand how fragile the government 
was; they didn't have a civil service there. We kept insisting that the 
French should give them independence and let them run their own affairs, but 
there weren't enough people to run their own affairs. 
Gibbons: Yes. 
Lansdale: There were a few top officials and a lot of greenhorns 
down in the government who were sitting at desks and wondering what you did at 
a desk. There were provinces to be governed, districts, and ministries. All 
that Vietnam really had was an army that was organized in battalions, out in 
the countryside, and little else to be the government. There were a few 
postal and radio clerks, and a few others, but pretty scattered and not 
trained, disciplined, and organized. It was a time when we should have been 
putting all of our strength and energies into teaching them how to govern 
themselves. Instead of that we were always putting demands on them as though 
they had a big, capable government. We wanted it run like Washington, but it 
was a far cry from a developed country. I felt that they needed some years to 
get ready for what the future held and here we were facing a Geneva-agreed 
plebescite in two years, and they were a long way from being ready for such an 
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election. We were still bringing people down to the South from the North and 
trying to get them settled in new homes and jobs. It was a real jumbled up 
period. It was not a time to change a government that was trying to cope with 
all of these things. With the sect fighting that went on, it was the worst 
damn thing that ever happened to a country -- to go through that type of a 
minor civil war in the face of all of the outside problems and the other very 
real internal problems that existed there. Everybody should have been helping 
construct the country and helping its people. The whole social fabric of the 
country had big gaps in it and it needed building up. So, I was very much 
opposed to just willfully playing around a little bit with the structure at 
that time. American officials would say, "Well, Diem's wrong." I said, 
"Well, tell me what it is and we'll see if it can be changed. It's very easy 
to do. Go and explain right from wrong." But they wanted to insist on 
demands. I thought at the time that we were being very impatient, 
politically. We weren't giving a chance for anything to settle in before we 
tried to change it. Some of the things the Vietnamese themselves were trying 
to do were wrong at the time, and they had to be restrained from hurting 
themselves -- including the forces fighting in there. Some of the French, I 
know damn well, were egging them on. I used to be at the butt end of a lot of 
that -- their enmity. I think they were hoping that I'd get killed off. It 
was a time that the United States in its new role should have acted as the 
greatest friend to those people. A friend doesn't come in and say, "Hey, 
you're doing that all wrong. Do it my way, or else I'm moving out." 
Gibbons: Yes. Well, after you left, between 1956 and 1961, do you 
think we did right by them then? 
Lansdale: Not altogether. 
Gibbons: What didn't we do? 
Lansdale: Well, that's when we started getting very demanding of 
Diem and didn't take the time to persuade him, and we let some of the 
political practices grow up that afterwards became so harmful and ended up in 
his getting killed. We should have been better caretakers of our role in 
there, since we were in there in the role of their best friends and weren't 
being. I remember I visited Vietnam in December of '60. There was going to 
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be a Presidential election the next year, and there were rumors that Diem was 
going to put up a different person to run with him as Vice President in place 
of Nguyen Ngoc Tho. I asked Diem about that and he said, well, his mind 
wasn't made up yet. He said, ''Well, I don't have anything against him." And 
I said, "Well, goddamn it, you used to be good friends and work together, and 
you understood each other. What's happened? When was the last time you saw 
h . ?" im. He said, "Oh, I see him all the time." And I said, "When' s the last 
time you had him over for dinner?" He said, "Oh, a short time ago. I don't 
know exactly when." So, I went over to the Economic Ministry and talked to 
Vice President Tho; among other things, he said, "That stupid guy Diem doesn't 
know how to run anything." An orderly was serving us tea in his office. I 
said "Does the orderly work for Diem?" He said, "I don't know." And I said, 
"He'll probably go over and report the way you're talking about him. How can 
Diem like you if you talk this way about him all of the time?" And he said, 
"Well, I don't really feel that way about him. I haven't seen him in some 
time." I said, "I just talked to Diem. He said he had you over for dinner 
recently." He said, I haven't had dinner with him for a year, or two 
years." So, I said., ''Would you have dinner with him?" He said, "Sure, I'd 
love to.'' He said, "He's a man with a lot of problems. I'd like to help him 
out." And I said, "That-a-boy." So, I went back and saw Diem. I told him, 
"Tho hasn't seen you for a year for dinner. Why don't you call him right now 
and invite him tonight for dinner?" So, Diem did. And he had him run for 
Vice President again. This is the way a friend should act, to bring people 
together in harmony to work together. 
Tho was a good man. 
him closely on the economy. 
The Americans liked him, those who worked with 
He was a very sophisticated guy. He really 
was. H~ was a financier . . He made the Ba My Ba beer that the Americans used 
to drink over there [ laughter J, and he loved mystery stories. When I went 
back, I used to take him mystery stories and he'd tell me all the things the 
United States was doing wrong in Vietnam. [ laughter] I'd go over, and I'd 
say, "Here are some new murder mysteries for you, now tell me now why you 
think we're being bad boys over here? You have a half hour to tell me." And 
he'd tell me. 
Gibbons: Did there ever come a time when you gave up on Diem? 
- 14 -
Lansdale: No, there were times when I was disappointed in what he 
was doing, but we were really such close friends that we could always talk 
frankly to each other. The last time I saw him was in 1961 when I went to 
Vietnam with Taylor and Rostow on a mission for Kennedy. When I was trying to 
talk to Diem, his brother Nhu came in, first time ever, and sat there with him 
and answered all of my questions and I said: "I didn't ask you. I was asking 
your brother, the President. Let him answer it." Diem looked sort of brow-
beaten by his brother by that time. It was a very strange meeting. I had 
dinner with him -- just the two of us alone -- Diem and me, and I said, "I'm 
worried that you rely so heavily on your brother for the key things that you 
should be thinking about and you let him answer." "Oh he knew the answers," 
he said. I said, "Yes, but we've never talked that way before. It's usually 
the two of us talking. You're the head of the country. He isn't. I know 
he's been supplying you with information and intelligence but it is wrong to 
rely too heavily on anyone else. You can listen to him and then make up your 
own mind, but don't let him speak for you." He said, ''Well, I didn't realize 
I was doing that." 
Gibbons: But did he change any after that? 
Lansdale: I don't think so, no. Maybe if I had stayed on in 
Vietnam and had seen him frequently, it might have been different. 
Gibbons: Well, in the late summer of '63, when the United States 
decided it really had to put the heat on, and then through until the coup, 
were you involved? 
Lansdale: No. 
Gibbons: .•. and how did you feel about what was going on? 
Lansdale: I didn't know that anything was going on. This .•. what 
I was just telling you was '61, the fall of '61, and when I got back to 
Washington I got mixed up with Cuban affairs, and then McNamara told me to 
stay out of putting my two bits in on what was happening in Vietnam -- which I 
was doing all of the time in the Pentagon. He said it was disturbing 
everybody. So, I was looking for other places to get involved, and I started 
going down to South America. The Cubans were starting their activities down 
there then, blowing up the oil rigs on Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela and were 
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training people and creating guerrilla forces all over South America. So, the 
defense ministries down there started asking me to come down and visit, which 
I did. I wanted to get out to the Middle East, and the Israelies invited me, 
but I guess the U.S. didn't want me to go there because I never got to 
Israel. The only place they'd let me go was South America. They were trying 
to keep me in the western hemisphere, I guess, by that time. I sensed 
something of Washington's unhappiness with Diem. In the late summer of '63 I 
was talking with Governor Harriman. He was asking me some questions about 
brother Nhu and Diem, and he told me he was very surprised at my viewpoints on 
things, I guess because I didn't want anyone to ki l l him [Diem], and my ideas 
weren't very military. But I was begging him to find a place for Nhu up at 
Ha rvard. I remember he had John Kenneth Galbraith, a Harvard economist with 
him, who had been Ambassador in India at the time. Galbraith was ha v-ing 
breakfast with us over at Harriman's house. I was saying that Galbraith and 
Harriman should get together and put up a group a t Harvard and invite Nhu over 
from Vietnam to be a member there. I said, "Kick him upstairs. Tell him he's 
an intellectual. Listen to im and give him a job the re. He'd come, and Diem 
would let him go. And once he's away, then Diem will be a very different 
person and be on his own and you won't have to worry so much about h. II 1m. 
Ga lbraith took a very dim view of it. And I said, "No, Nhu's a real smart 
guy . He's obnoxious like most of you intellectuals -- he sort of gets on my 
nerves a little bit." Galbraith was real mad at me for suggesting it, and I 
couldn't help teasing him. But it would have been one one way out for him. 
Gibbons: What was Harriman's reaction? 
Lansdale: Harriman liked it. He s aid, "I like the way you think 
and I like ideas like this." I said, •~ell, Diem gave his father a death-bed 
promise that he would take care of his youngest brother, Nhu. And now we 
Americans have come in and bluntly told him to get rid of Nhu. Well, his 
father's wishes mean more to him. He's a family man. Instead of that, if we 
had gone in and said, 'We have a real good job for Nhu and want you to help us 
convince him to go,' he'd do it. You know, he'd tnin.k it was good for his 
brother, which it would be." And I said, "And Nhu is a real intellectual. He 
_really is. He's a deep political student. I don't agree with him on a lot of 
things but that doesn't say that he doesn't have a lot on the ball, because he 
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does. " But we didn't do i t . I could feel that something was happening. 
Then , I went over and talked to the assistant s ecretary of State for the Far 
East. Harriman told me to see him -- he ' s teaching up at Columbia now. ~~\ v-"I~ 
~ l ') 
Gibbons: Hi lsman? 
Lansnale: Hilsman. Roger Hilsman. Roger kept talking about h i s 
forthcoming t r i p to Australia, and I said, "No , Harri man wants me to talk 
about Vietnam to you. You must be about to do something. Tell me what it is, 
so I ' l l know, and maybe I can help you, come up with some ideas for you. " And 
he'd keep going back to Australia. He wouldn' t t alk about Vi e tnam at a ll. I 
went in and saw McNamara and he must have hinted at forthcoming changes in 
Saigon. I r emember saying , "Don't fo rge t there's a consti tution there. Keep 
it alive. Don't go monkeying around trying to overcome the will of the people 
to make some new idea work. And don't forget there's a constitutional vice 
president t here, " and so on. I remember telling him that. So , I was getting 
hints of some t hing, but no t the facts. I was retired the end of October, 
1963, which was t he f i r st of Novembe r i n Sa i gon. My f r iends in the press 
s tarted calling me that night, the first time I was home after retiring, and 
they were very surprised I was home and not out i n Vietnam . I said , ''Why?" 
and they said, ''We have a flash from Saigon tha t t here ' s a revo l t against Diem 
there. They're trying to overthrow him. The armed forces are taking over and 
we thought you ' d be out there, that maybe you were running it or something . " 
And I said, "No. I didn't even know about it . " 
Gibbons: Do you remember what McNamara ' s reaction was when you were 
talking to him? 
Lansdale: He listened but he never listened fully. [laughter] I 
talked to him a number of · times about Vietnam and I never felt that he was 
paying full attention to me . I remember when he was trying to computerize the 
war and he called me in one day. He had a long list of entries for a 
computer, including the body count type of stuff, enemy casualties. He had 
written them out in a hard- lead pencil, I remember, on graph paper. And I 
said, "Your list i s incomplete . You've left out the most important factor of 
all." He said, "What is it? " I said , "Well, it's the human factor. You can 
put it down as the X factor. " So , he wrote down in pencil, "X factor." He 
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said, "What does it consist of?" I said, "What the people out on the 
battlefield really feel; which side they want to see win and which side 
they're for at the moment. That's the only way you're going to ever have this 
war decided." And he said, "Tell me how to put it in?" I said, "I don't 
think any Americans out there at the moment can report this to you." He said, 
"Oh, well," and he got out an eraser to erase it. I said, "No, leave it 
there." Then I took about a week trying to figure how you get answers on 
that, which I did finally. They later used the ideas for the hamlet 
evaluation system. Mine was a way to get our troops to report when they went 
in villages, whether the people, the kids, were smiling or present -- a whole 
bunch of facts -- a very complicated type of evaluation. But at the time I 
was pleading with McNamara not to codify a war and then believe what the 
figures were telling him. I said , "You 're going to fool yourself if you get 
all of these figures added up because they won't tell you how we're doing in 
this war." 
Gibbons: What was his reaction to that? 
Lansdale: He asked me to please not bother him anymore. 
[laughter] He used to say, "Thank you, I've got something else to do now." 
No, I could seldom talk to him. When he was first made Secretary of Defense 
-- the first day in office -- I was just back from a trip to Vietnam. He 
asked me to please come in and brief him. I was down in my office nearby. I 
had a lot of Viet Cong weapons, punji stakes, and so on, that I'd collected in 
Vietnam to get the Special Forces to start a Fort Bragg museum of guerrilla 
weapons and they still had Vietnamese mud on them, rusty and dirty. They 
were picked up from the battle field. So, I tucked all of these under my arm 
and went to his office. He had told me on the phone that I had five minutes 
to give him a briefing on Vietnam. I went in and he was sitting at his desk 
and I put all of these dirty weapons down -- crude looking, and including 
those big spikes that they had as punji stakes with dried blood and mud on 
them -- I put them on this beautiful mahogony desk -- I just dumped them on 
that. I said, "The enemy in Vietnam use these weapons -- and they were just 
using them just a little bit ago before I got them. Many of them are barefoot 
or wear sandals. They wear black pajamas, usually, with tatters or holes in 
them. I don't think you'd recognize any of them as soldiers, but they think 
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of themselves that way. The people that are fighting them, on our side, are 
being supplied with our weapons and uniforms and good shoes and all of the 
best that we have; and we' re training them. Yet, the enemy is licking our 
side," I said. "Always keep in mind about Vietnam, that the struggle goes far 
beyond the material things of life, It doesn't take weapons and uniforms and 
lots of food to win. It takes something else, ideas and ideals, and these 
guys are using that something else. Let's at least learn that lesson." 
Somehow, I found him very hard to talk to. Watching his face as I talked, I 
got the feeling that he didn't understand me. Too unconventional. Somehow, I 
found him very hard to talk to. 
Gibbons: You said earlier that he bears a very heavy responsibility 
for what happened. Could you explain that? 
Lansdale: We used to call it his war -- McNamara's war -- even the 
troops out in Vietnam used to call it that. And all of a sudden he wasn't 
Secretary of Defense anymore, and then it became somebody else's war, and he 
got out of the whole thing. But originally he felt very strongly about what 
was going on in Vietnam. He used to make trips out there all of the time. He 
used to confer with the President, the Chiefs in the Pentagon, and argue for 
his Vietnam budget up on the Hill. He was the Administration's leader on 
Vietnam affairs. Perhaps I was too critical of the big U.S. bureaucratic 
buildup in Vietnam. He took me off of reporting to him or saying anything to 
him about it by Fall, 1961, 
Gibbons: That's the point at which he took you off? 
Lansdale: Pretty much, yes. I think I was probably making waves in 
there. Maybe the Chiefs had asked him to keep me quiet. I know that they 
felt that I was very unconventional. I recall that one time General Buzz 
Wheeler, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, asked if I would take one of 
his rambun~tious colonels on my OSD staff [laughter] for a time and protect 
him from being annihilated by his own staff. Wheeler thought very highly of 
this colonel who was very, very outspoken on things, They brought him back to 
the U.S. from Vietnam and he told Kennedy that things weren't going well there 
to the great embarrassment of the Army. 
Gibbons: Is it John Paul Vann you're talking about? 
f r 
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Lansdale: Yes. I liked Vann. He was very outspoken, but he had a 
big heart. He told me how he despised Huynh Van Cao, who was a friend of mine 
to whom Vann had been assigned as an advisor, for the way Cao fought the 
enemy, and that it was a stupid way he was fighting. I had to agree that it 
was a lousy way to fight. Later, when Diem was overthrown, Cao got it; he had 
been so close to Diem that the other generals gave him a very bad time, and 
kicked him out of his job. Cao had a very large family, many children. Vann 
was living in Colorado at the time. He took all of his savings from the bank 
and got it over to Vietnam and loaned it to Cao to help him. Vann was deeply, 
emotionally committed to Vietnam and the Vietnamese people. I told the Army 
the same thing. I said, "You should listen to him. I think he's telling the 
truth on these things. He believes it truly," which he did. 
Gibbons: Well, he must have been a very independent kind of a guy. 
Lansdale: He was, very, very much so, likeable, though, with it 
all. We wound up close friends, despite all that. He didn't believe some of 
the things that I said. He used to tell me as much. And I said, "That's all 
right." 
Gibbons: Back to the question of the coup. Were you shocked? What 
was your reaction to what we did? 
Lansdale: I thought it was a terrible, stupid thing. First of all, 
Diem was a friend of mine, so it came as a personal shock when he was 
killed. Secondly, the action itself didn't make military sense to me. We 
divided our forces in the face of the enemy -- a military "no-no." South 
Vietnam was up against a very aggressive, smart, and imaginative enemy who was 
fighting the war from a political basis. And on our side, we paid too little 
attentiol) to the political .basis which we needed to wage a war. By killing 
Diem, we split our political side at least in two if not more parts, and doing 
that in the face of the enemy who would take advantage of it right away. I 
felt we were too weak to play around that way, and I thought it was the worst 
thing that we ever did. I still can't understand anybody's thinking on 
that. And the enemy did take advantage of it right away. I'm sure that some 
place along the line we'll find all of the ways that they did. 






moment. I think we should never have done it. We destroyed the Vietnamese 
Constitution, not we, but the people we were working with, threw it in the 
waste basket. The governmental structure was destroyed -- the province chiefs 
and the district chiefs and so forth, the whole structure went down . And from 
then on, as they kept on having more and more coups and new generals would 
take over, they'd destroy the whole structure of government again, all of the 
province chiefs and so forth. There were always people who didn't quite know 
their jobs throughout the country, and we were thinking all of the time that 
they were all solid and held together, but they weren ' t people to do that. 
And we didn't realize it. Even today I don't think any of the historians have 
ever figured out that it happened that way, but we destroyed the whole 
government side of the social structure in one fell-blow. 
Gibbons: How could we have done something like that? 
Lansdale: I don't know. I know that some things had gone wrong, 
but why we didn't try constructive ways of repairing damage that we'd see --
it's far more rational to talk people into correcting mistakes than to shoot 
them and thus get them out of the way. 
Gibbons: Well, Fulbright wrote a book about the arrogance of 
power. Was this an aspect of that? 
AGB 
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Lansdale: Might have been. Might have been. 
